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Abstract  
 
The events of the Cuban Missile Crisis, during which the Cold War between the American and 
Soviet superpowers nearly went hot, were, according to some historians, “the most perilous in 
the planet’s history” and the closest belligerent forces have ever come to engaging in mutual 
thermonuclear conflict. The thirteen days of the crisis—which took place during the latter half of 
October, 1962—hallmarked the placating, diplomatic intentions of the American and Soviet 
heads of state and showed that cooperation between capitalists and communists could occur in 
the interests of the preservation of their respective systems and states. The progress of the 
situation was publicized to the nations of both superpowers, with frequent updates in 
newspapers, radio broadcasts, and television features, but the diffusion of the Soviet-American 
tensions around Cuban shores was not won precisely the way public media announced. 
Negotiations involving nuclear missiles stationed by NATO in Turkey had been key to the rise of 
the crisis, and were an important bargaining chip in the diplomatic course elected by American 
President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, a secret which was held by 
both parties for over twenty years. This presentation will take a closer look at the missiles placed 
in Turkey and at their roles in both igniting and diffusing the situation. The Cuban Missile Crisis 
hosted benefits for the different states involved: Cuba was promised to not be invaded by the 
United States again. Turkey received stronger protection via ICBMs. The Soviet Union no longer 
needed to fear nuclear missiles coming from Turkey. Likewise, the United States no longer 
needed to fear nuclear missiles coming from Cuba. The situation took relations between the 
Soviet and American heads of state to a high and fostered mutual understanding between the two 
leaders; both states had been willing to grant concessions in favor of the other, perhaps opening a 
new doorway to the mollification of American-Soviet relations. But with President John F. 
Kennedy’s assassination thirteen months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev’s removal the following year, this new passage of understanding was transient at 
best, and hopes of a mutual movement to ease the Cold War ended with the respective 
administrations. It is impossible to speculate what would have happened had the two heads of 
state remained in office. Perhaps more understandings between the United States and Soviet 
Union would have transpired; perhaps not. Such speculations cannot rewrite history, and after 
the crisis in Cuba, there would be another quarter of a century until the Cold War would end, and 
tensions between the American and Russian nations have yet to fully diffuse. 
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